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In Libertarianism without Inequality,1 I present and defend an approach to political 
philosophy, and a set of moral and political principles, that draw their inspiration from John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. Locke’s classical liberalism has, in the not-too-
distant past, provided an inspiration for the right-wing libertarian political philosophy of 
Robert Nozick, as spelled out in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia.2 My book is an attempt 
to contribute to recent efforts to reclaim Locke from the libertarian right and to show how his 
writings can provide an inspiration for a strongly egalitarian version of libertarianism. It is an 
attempt to vindicate, in a more comprehensively systematic fashion than has previously been 
attempted, a political philosophy that has come to be known as left-libertarianism, which 
combines stringent rights of control over oneself with egalitarian rights of ownership of the 
world. 
 Like all other versions of Lockean libertarianism, mine takes a right of self-ownership 
seriously, where such a right consists of robust and stringent rights of control over one’s 
mind, body, and life. Many on the left as well as the right – and not just those who are 
libertarian – insist that individuals possess stringent rights to control their bodies that stand in 
the way of their being used as means by being forced to donate vital bodily organs such as a 
heart or a liver, or being forced to donate non-vital body parts or products such as an eye or a 
kidney, or blood or bone marrow. They also insist that individuals possess stringent rights 
that stand in the way of their being used as means by being forced via threat of imprisonment 
                                                 
1 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Most of what follows in the main text is a précis of this book that 
focuses on the main lines of argument. 
2 New York: Basic Books, 1974. 
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to work for the sake of the good of others. Anyone who affirms such rights thereby affirms a 
right of self-ownership. The anti-paternalistic and anti-moralistic implications of this right 
will be attractive to those who find themselves in sympathy with the conclusions that John 
Stuart Mill draws in On Liberty. When it comes to such things as freedom of expression, the 
legalization of euthanasia, of sexual relations of any sort between consenting adults, of the 
possession of cannabis and other recreational drugs, of gambling, and the like, I am 
completely at one with other libertarians. At a more theoretical level, the anti-consequentialist 
nature of the right of self-ownership to which Lockean libertarians appeal will be congenial 
to those who are unconvinced by Mill’s utilitarian arguments for these conclusions. Even 
many who would never describe themselves as libertarian find themselves in a great deal of 
sympathy with Nozick’s non-consequentialist justification of rights as side-constraints, with 
its emphasis on the separateness of persons and the indefensibility of the sacrificial use of 
persons as means for the greater good.  
 I part company with Nozick, however, insofar as I reject his claim that a right of self-
ownership stands in the way of an egalitarian redistribution of worldly resources. Nozick has 
famously argued that redistributive taxation of income is ‘on a par’ with forced labour. I 
show that Nozick’s complaint against redistributive taxation is not essentially a complaint 
about being forced to work. Rather, it is essentially an objection to the infringement of 
property rights. I also show that only in highly unusual cases would a redistributive tax on 
income necessarily involve an infringement of an individual’s property rights in self (i.e., 
self-ownership). Assuming that ‘income’ is understood as any beneficial material goods that 
one gains as the result of one’s labour, we might imagine, for purposes of illustration, an 
unusual case in which a person’s only income is the clothing she weaves out of her own hair. 
Suppose that the state imposes a 50% tax on income, from which it follows that this person 
must surrender half of whatever she weaves for purpose of redistribution to the needy. Here 
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the weaver’s rights of ownership over her means of production and the fruits of her labour are 
grounded solely and completely in her right of self-ownership. Her means of production 
consist of nothing more than her mind and parts of her body, and the fruits of her labour 
consist of nothing more than parts of her body that have been transformed into items that are 
suitable to be worn as clothing. Hence the income tax constitutes an infringement of her right 
of self-ownership. 
 When, however, as is typically the case in actual fact, one must make use of the world 
in order to earn income, the state does not necessarily infringe any right of self-ownership if 
it takes some of the fruits of one’s labour. Consider the case of a farmer who is forced by the 
government, on pain of imprisonment, to give half of whatever she harvests to hungry 
orphans. If the farmer had voluntarily purchased the land she farms from someone on the 
condition that she give half of her harvest to the needy, then the state would do no wrong by 
stepping in to force her to give this portion away to the needy. Such force would infringe no 
property right of the farmer’s. Rather, it would be a justifiable means of enforcing a voluntary 
contractual obligation. Now suppose that it were more generally the case that we could come 
to legitimately own any bit of land or other worldly resource only on the condition that we 
share some of whatever we reap from it with others. If this were true, then the state’s forcing 
each of us to share our harvest with others would be no more an infringement of self-
ownership than in the previous case involving the enforcement of a contractual obligation. 
Alternatively, we might legitimately acquire rights of ownership over land and other worldly 
resources that entitle us to keep all of the fruits of our labour. But this entitlement might only 
extend to such acquisition that is consistent with the realization of equality. I shall explain 
below how such egalitarian entitlement is consistent with self-ownership. 
 Before doing so, I shall explain why I endorse such an egalitarian approach to justice 
in acquisition of land and other worldly resources in preference to Nozick’s approach. Nozick 
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defends a highly inegalitarian principle of justice in acquisition, according to which you may 
acquire previously unowned land (and its fruits) if and only if you make nobody else worse 
off than she would have been in a state of nature in which no land is privately held but each is 
free to gather and consume food and water from the land and make use of it. Following G. A. 
Cohen, I argue that Nozick’s principle of justice in acquisition is unsound, since it allows a 
‘first grabber’ to monopolize all opportunities to improve one’s lot through acquisition by 
preempting others from making any acquisitions of their own that would improve their 
situations over that in which they live no better than a meagre hand-to-mouth existence of 
hunters and gatherers on non-private land.3 Any such principle of ‘winner take the lion’s 
share’ is prima facie less fair than a principle of acquisition which gives rise to a more equal 
distribution of resources. I endorse an egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition, according 
to which you may acquire previously unowned worldly resources if and only if you leave 
enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned worldly 
resources. One’s coming to acquire previously unowned resources under these terms leaves 
nobody else at a disadvantage (or, in Locke’s words, is ‘no prejudice to any others’), where 
being left at a disadvantage is understood as being left with less than an equally advantageous 
share of resources. I maintain, moreover, that shares are equally advantageous insofar as they 
make it possible for each to attain the same level of welfare as anybody else. 
 Such a commitment to equality of opportunity for welfare renders my left-
libertarianism more strongly egalitarian than others. A more weakly egalitarian form of 
Lockean left-libertarianism might, for example, maintain that shares are equally 
advantageous just in case they are such that none would prefer to trade her bundle of worldly 
resources with anybody else’s.4 On this more weakly egalitarian principle of justice in 
                                                 
3 See Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
ch. 3. 
4 See Steiner, ‘Capitalism, Justice, and Equal Starts’, Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987): 49-71. This article 
does not reflect Steiner’s current view, which is more strongly egalitarian. 
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acquisition, people who are less able to convert resources into welfare would not be 
compensated for this disability, whereas they would be so compensated on my version. I 
believe that any weaker, less egalitarian principle of acquisition than mine would, like 
Nozick’s, unfairly allow some to reap greater gains in welfare than others from their 
acquisition of unowned land and other worldly resources. 
 The embrace of some form of egalitarianism with respect to the ownership of worldly 
resources is essentially what distinguishes a left-libertarian from more familiar right-wing 
libertarians such as Nozick. It is what makes left-libertarianism ‘left’. But how is it 
nevertheless still ‘libertarian’? As I mentioned above, a commitment to self-ownership, with 
all that it implies regarding personal freedom and bodily integrity, is one that left-libertarians 
share with other libertarians. I add here that there is a respect in which a left-libertarian’s 
egalitarian commitments in the domain of distributive justice are also appropriately described 
as libertarian. There are many different forms of egalitarianism, ranging from those that 
embrace strict equality of outcome to those that embrace some form of equality of 
opportunity. To illustrate this difference, imagine two individuals – call them Adrian and 
Bruce – who start off their adult lives with equally valuable shares of worldly resources.5 Let 
us imagine further that Adrian and Bruce are equally talented, capable, and healthy and 
equally good at converting resources into welfare. In these special circumstances, they each 
have the same opportunity to become rich or poor and happy or unhappy as the result of their 
wealth or poverty. How rich or poor, and happy or unhappy as a result, they end up will 
simply depend on the particular choices they make. So if Adrian works hard, invests, and 
saves his initially equal share, and Bruce simply relaxes on the beach while consuming his 
initially equal share, their shares, as reflected by the wealth they possess, will be highly 
unequal at the end of the year. An egalitarian who insists on equality of outcome would call 
                                                 
5 This example is modelled on Ronald Dworkin’s, and the lessons I draw from it are his. See Sovereign Virtue 
(Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 2. 
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for a redistribution to equalize the wealth of Adrian and Bruce. An egalitarian who is instead 
concerned to preserve equality of opportunity would condemn such redistribution, since the 
inequalities in wealth that arise as the result of the differing choices of Adrian and Bruce are 
consistent with equality of opportunity. Bruce could have become as wealthy as Adrian by 
making the same choices as Adrian, and Adrian could have enjoyed himself as much as 
Bruce by making the same choices as Bruce. It would be unfair to redistribute wealth from 
Adrian to Bruce in order to equalize outcomes, as then Bruce would end up better off, all 
things considered, than Adrian, since he will benefit from the same level of wealth as Adrian 
and also have been able to enjoy the consumption of goods and leisure that Adrian was not 
able to enjoy. Since an opportunity-based form of egalitarianism is more sensitive to the 
particular choices that individuals make than an outcome-based form of egalitarianism, it is 
the more ‘libertarian’ form of egalitarianism. 
 I argue that a right of self-ownership is perfectly compatible with my highly 
egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition that calls for a distribution of worldly resources 
that equalizes opportunity for welfare. To illustrate this compatibility claim, I ask the reader 
to consider a land reform policy that is relevantly analogous to my egalitarian principle of 
justice in acquisition. Under this policy, government-owned land is transferred to individuals 
who have less opportunity for welfare than others because they have inherited less land from 
their ancestors than others have inherited.6 Ownership of this land is transferred to the point 
at which the welfare that each can derive from the sum total of her holdings in land after this 
transfer is equal. Just as my strongly egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition 
compensates people for differences in their mental and physical capacities that bear on their 
efficiency in converting resources into welfare, this policy compensates people for 
differences in the value of their initial holdings in land. Yet the land reform policy in no way 
                                                 
6 Here I assume unequal inheritances merely for the sake of argument. In my book, I argue that a defensible 
principle of justice in initial acquisition would render bequests impossible. So such circumstances of unequal 
inheritance could not arise under my left-libertarianism. 
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diminishes the ownership rights over the initial holdings that people had inherited. The state 
would, no doubt, infringe libertarian property rights in inherited land if, instead of pursuing 
the above policy, it seized some of that land and transferred it to the less well off. But it does 
not infringe any libertarian right of ownership over land by giving more land to those who 
have less and less to those who have more. Similarly, the state would infringe a healthy 
person’s right of self-ownership if it forcibly transplanted one of his kidneys into the body of 
someone who needed it. Yet it does not infringe any right of self-ownership by allowing 
those who have lesser talents to acquire more land than those who have greater talents, as 
they would be allowed to do under my strongly egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition. 
 I show how it would be possible, without violating anybody’s self-ownership, to 
provide those who are unable to engage in productive labour with the opportunity to acquire 
enough worldly resources to generate a steady, generous, and lifelong flow of income from 
the investment, rental, or sale of these resources. Such income would provide these disabled 
individuals with the same opportunity for welfare as able-bodied individuals who are 
themselves provided with the opportunity to acquire a fairly generous portion of worldly 
resources. The holdings of the able bodied would be sufficiently generous that the disabled 
would be able to support themselves through truly voluntary exchanges with the able bodied 
that do not involve forced assistance. By these means, one could achieve equality without any 
encroachments upon anyone’s robust right of self-ownership, where a right of self-ownership 
is robust if and only if, in addition to having the right itself, one also has rights over enough 
worldly resources to insure that one will not be forced by necessity to come to the assistance 
of others in a manner involving the sacrifice of one’s life, limb, or labour. 
 To provide a simple and artificial illustration of such an arrangement, imagine an 
island society divided into a large number of able bodied and a smaller number of disabled 
individuals. All the beachfront property is divided among the disabled, and farmable land in 
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the interior is divided among the able bodied. The able bodied each voluntarily purchase 
access to the beach in exchange for the provision of food to the disabled. Such a division of 
land might provide the disabled and the able bodied with the same opportunity for welfare 
without anyone’s being forced to come to the assistance of anybody else. Although this is a 
highly artificial example, I believe that there is nothing in principle that would rule out the 
redistribution of land and other worldly resources to a fairly wide range of the disabled in a 
relatively prosperous actually-existing society such as France so that they would similarly 
possess enough capital with which to purchase the goods of life through voluntary exchanges 
with able-bodied individuals.  
 But what is to be done in circumstances in which self-ownership and equality cannot 
be reconciled in the manner just proposed? Suppose, for example, that the able-bodied simply 
lack the desire to consume any goods, or to engage in any productive labour, beyond that 
which is necessary for their own subsistence. If the rights of self-ownership of these able-
bodied individuals are to be robust, then they must own enough worldly resources to sustain 
themselves. But if they have enough to sustain themselves, they will have no motive to 
engage in any labour that would sustain the disabled, no matter how wealthy the latter may 
be. Here, in the absence of voluntary charitable contributions, the basic needs of those who 
are unable to engage in productive labour will be met only if the able-bodied are forced to 
engage in productive labour on their behalf.  
 I defend the claim that liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin who endorse 
the welfare state and libertarians such as Nozick who endorse the minimal state can find 
common ground in support of an unfamiliar means of forcing able-bodied individuals to 
come to the assistance of the disabled in order to provide for their basic needs in these 
circumstances. Such means would not involve the familiar redistributive taxation of the 
income of all able-bodied individuals, where this tax is ultimately enforced by coercive threat 
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of imprisonment. Rather, assistance to the disabled would be provided by the coercive 
taxation of only those able-bodied individuals who have been properly convicted of 
performing justifiably criminalized acts. I argue that many liberal egalitarians will discover 
that a strong case can be made for such taxation of the unjust, since such a scheme would 
mitigate the objectionable nature of the coercion that must be applied in order to provide for 
the disabled, even if this case is ultimately less strong than the case that can be made for the 
coercive taxation of all able-bodied individuals. I also argue that libertarians who reject 
standard schemes of coercive redistributive taxation will not also be able to resist the case for 
taxation of the unjust. 
 
Thus far I have focussed on the left-libertarian approach regarding the relation between self-
ownership and world-ownership and the related topic of the justice of holdings of worldly 
resources. This has been the near-exclusive focus of most of the writing of left-libertarians.7 
Libertarianism, however, is not just a theory about the relation between self-ownership and 
world-ownership. It also addresses the conditions under which the state can have legitimate 
political authority over those whom it governs. I defend a voluntaristic Lockean account of 
legitimate political authority, according to which such authority is derived from, and only 
from, the free, rational, and informed consent of each of the governed. It is only by one’s own 
consent that such governance is compatible with one’s self-ownership. 
 Locke affirmed that individuals tacitly consent to the authority of a government 
simply by remaining within the boundaries of the territory over which the government has 
dominion. David Hume famously criticized Lockean tacit consent on the ground that it is not 
genuinely free in light of the economic and cultural costs of withholding one’s consent in the 
                                                 
7 See the works anthologized in Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner, eds., Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: 
The Contemporary Debate (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 2000). 
 
 10
only way possible: by leaving the political society in which one lives.8 This is the first of two 
familiar criticisms of the claim that such consent is a sufficient condition of subjection to the 
legitimate authority of a government. The second criticism is that such consent is not 
forthcoming against a background of equality and is hence tainted by the unequal bargaining 
power of the contracting parties. 
 I offer a reconstruction of Locke’s theory of legitimate political authority that is 
informed by the aim of overcoming both of these problems with his account of tacit consent. 
This reconstruction is left-libertarian insofar as it builds on my egalitarian interpretation of 
the Lockean principle of justice in acquisition of worldly resources. On my egalitarian 
version of this principle, any individual who chooses not to submit to the authority of the 
government of any political society would retain the opportunity to acquire or purchase a plot 
of land outside of the jurisdiction of these political societies and declare it a one-person 
sovereignty governed by laws of one’s own making and of which one is the sole enforcer. 
Such a right to live on one’s own outside of the jurisdiction of any political society will imply 
a right of the individual to secession in the absence of suitable ungoverned land on which to 
found one’s own sovereignty. 
 Given such rights of world-ownership free from the authority of political societies that 
I have just described, the Humean complaint regarding the unfreedom of tacit consent loses 
its edge, since each unconsenting individual would have the option of withdrawing not into 
the ocean, but into the plot of land which he would have the opportunity to acquire or 
purchase under the correct egalitarian principles of justice in acquisition and which he would 
be entitled to declare a sovereign and independent entity. Moreover, the egalitarian nature of 
                                                 
8 In “Of the Original Contract”, Hume wrote that to say that “a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave 
his country when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages 
which he acquires” is akin to saying “that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of 
the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment 
he leaves her”. 
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the principle of world-ownership that I endorse addresses the second complaint against 
Lockean voluntarism to which I referred earlier: the complaint that Lockean consent is not 
forthcoming against a background of equality and is hence tainted by the unequal bargaining 
power of the contracting parties. 
 This alternative of withdrawing into a self-governed plot of land reduces, but I 
acknowledge that it does not eliminate, the force of Hume’s objection to tacit consent via 
residence. A serious problem remains: for many individuals no sum of worldly resources 
would render life in isolation outside political society nearly as good as life in political 
society under ordinary and reasonably attractive circumstances. For such individuals, the 
alternative of life outside any political society would not in itself be sufficient to justify the 
claim that residence within the boundaries of a given society constitutes morally binding tacit 
consent to its government. In their case, the following would typically be necessary in order 
to justify an inference of morally binding tacit consent from the fact of residence in a given 
political society. It would be necessary that these individuals have a diverse range of choices 
of political societies which occupy the full range of political, cultural, and urban-to-rural 
possibilities to which people tend to be attracted. It would also be necessary that they possess 
the material resources to flourish in any of a range of these societies and to easily relocate 
from one to another. In such circumstances, it would be justifiable to infer from the choices 
of individuals to remain within the borders of a given political society rather than any of the 
others that they genuinely consent to the authority of the government of this society. We can 
infer that it is not simply out of resignation, in the face of a paucity of choice, that they 
remain in this one rather than another, but rather because they were able, given the diverse 
range of possibilities, to live in a community that suits them well. 
 A distribution of resources in accordance with the egalitarian proviso would tend to 
provide individuals with the wherewithal to flourish in any of a number of different societies 
 12
and to move from one to another. But an egalitarian distribution of resources would not in 
itself be sufficient to ensure the diversity of political societies. Additional measures involving 
the decentralization of political authority and the fostering of local autonomy would need to 
be taken in order to realize this. A pluralistic confederation of political societies on the small 
scale of autonomous cities, towns, and regions would be more likely to provide such a 
diversity of choice than political societies on a larger scale in which the laws and institutions 
are fairly uniform throughout, even if they are uniformly liberal throughout. Hence, these are 
the political arrangements that I endorse. 
 Even when remedied of the aforementioned problems of unfreedom and inequality, a 
Lockean account of political legitimacy faces the following challenge: Lockean consent 
would nevertheless be capable of legitimizing highly illiberal or hierarchical political 
societies. To show how this would be possible, I begin with the observation that a private 
individual is entitled to mark the boundaries of her estate as a line which another may cross 
only if that other thereby tacitly consents, by means of such crossing, to profoundly illiberal 
or hierarchical rules of her household and its grounds. She would, for example, be entitled to 
admit into her household or its grounds only those who agree to strict puritanical limitations 
regarding manner of dress, consumption of drugs and alcohol, smoking, sexual practices, 
freedom of expression, freedom of worship, and the like. On the Lockean account of the rise 
of legitimate political societies that I endorse, things would be no different if many 
individuals each came to acquire legitimate titles of private ownership over adjacent estates 
that together cover an area the size of Paris. They could jointly sign a compact that declares 
that setting foot on any one of their estates constitutes tacit agreement to a set of highly 
illiberal or hierarchical rules and regulations. They could mutually agree to transfer the right 
to enforce these rules to a common government. To account for the existence of public land 
which is characteristic of cities, they would also be entitled to donate portions of their estates 
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over to the collective. This collectively owned land could be transformed into public streets, 
parks, plazas, a town hall, and so forth. Eventually, by a series of steps, a fully-fledged city 
will emerge through this transformation of private property rights over adjacent plots of land. 
Yet at no point, on the Lockean account, will individuals lose the rights that they had at the 
outset to govern their plots of land, and whatever they build on this land, in accordance with 
illiberal or hierarchical principles. 
 Though some would regard this implication as a reductio ad absurdum of Lockean 
voluntarism, I argue to the contrary that illiberal or hierarchical societies could in fact be 
legitimized by the free and equal consent of their members. My voluntaristic account of 
political legitimacy which is based on actual consent therefore yields a substantive political 
morality that differs in crucial respects from the liberal-egalitarian Kantian hypothetical-
contractualist approaches to political legitimacy that can be found in the writings of Rawls 
and Nagel.9 Their approach implies that liberal egalitarian principles are mandatory 
throughout the land even in the face of the free, rational, and informed Lockean consent, in 
circumstances of equality, of some of the governed to contrary illiberal or hierarchical 
principles. I reject this approach, since I maintain that it places restrictions upon individuals’ 
freedom of political association in a manner that is inconsistent with full respect for their 
status as autonomous, rational agents and for the choices they have made in fair 
circumstances of equality. 
                                                 
9 Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Nagel, Equality and Partiality 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
